Archives
Questions & Answers
Claude Welch is SUNY Distinguished Service Professor in the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences. He is an expert on military topics, terrorism and the ages-old conflict between those who wage war and those who seek peace, and the political factors influencing that conflict.
Do you think the United States had any business invading Iraq?
My judgment is mixed on this. There was no clear act of aggression, either against a neighboring state (as in 1990) or against the United States. The case linking Saddam Hussein with Osama bin Laden is circumstantial at best, to the extent I've seen information.
On the other hand, prior to the invasion, UN inspectors found evidence of undeclared and/or undestroyed weapons denied to the Iraqi regime under Security Council Resolution 1441 (which was the most recent of a dozen resolutions of concern or condemnation). These greater access of the inspectors clearly resulted from stronger U.S. pressure, both military and psychological. As scores of others have pointed out, the United States has taken on an onerous, essentially go-it-alone policy. The repercussions spread far beyond the battlefield, affecting the region, the U.S. and (let us not forget) potentially the entire world. The issues raised are strategic, military, philosophical and political.
Philosophers have discussed the issue of morality in war for centuries. Michael Walzer, W. V. O'Brian and UB philosopher Randall Dipert are more informed and thoughtful than I. However, let me, as a political scientist rather than philosopher, summarize what has emerged as major areas of agreement.
The most common philosophical distinction lies between ius ad bellum, the right to go to war, and ius in bello, appropriate conduct in wartime. I will examine each separately.
Is it morally permissible to go to war? First, is there a just cause? Have there been serious wrongs committed by Iraq? Yes. Second, is there no other way to right these wrongs? More active inspections occurred, as I just noted; however, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Third, is the resort to war not more destructive than righting the wrong is morally worth? Arguably, had Saddam Hussein and his sons been killed in the opening attack (i.e., had the house rather than the bunker been targeted), the result might be different from what we see unfolding. Fourth, is there some prospect of righting the wrong by going to war? The Bush administration has unveiled an ambitious scenario of regime change leading to a domino effect of democratization through the region and the like. Skeptics abound.
The ius ad bellum hinges on five items. First, what is a sufficient wrong? Self-defense is far and away the most readily accepted (but see Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars" and more recent writings, in this regard). Second, is there proportionality? In other words, will combat involve more destruction than righting the wrong is worth? The focus here is usually on civilian casualties, "collateral damage" in combat. Third, is war undertaken as a last resort? Have all possible means of negotiation been exhausted? This means, correlatively, that peaceful alternatives are possible. Fourth, is there a prospect of success? This is the reason France and other states pressed for a second Security Council resolution. And, finally, is there right intention? Those who wage war should do so for peace and justice, not to impose hatred and revenge.
The second major aspect, ius in bello or right conduct in war, evaluates acts of war themselves. First, are non-combatants immune from deliberate killing? Second, is there proportionality (as in the ius ad bellum), in which harmful side effects might be permitted out of proportion to the good sought? Third, is there military necessity, or in the more frequent term, last resort? Evidence is at best mixed on the second and third questions.
How does this war with Iraq differ from the 1991 Persian Gulf War?
They are different wars. 1991 involved a large number of partners, willing to pony up troops, financial support, basing rights and the like. Diplomatic efforts were far more successful—for the simple reasons that a) there was genuine outrage about Iraq's blatant invasion, b) 9/11 hadn't happened, and c) many other countries felt the threat (e.g., Japan and most of Europe to critical oil supplies, parts of the Middle East [most notably Israel] to security, Saudi Arabia to internal stability).
Obviously, too, there was a different President in 1991, more seasoned internationally, and willing to work via Secretary of State James Baker and others to build a coalition. The U.S. military, operating under what was called the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, believed in amassing and applying overwhelming force. Desert Storm succeeded in blinding Iraqi electronic defense systems. It could move on the ground with such speed (after months of preparation) because of months of softening up. Iraqi troops were outflanked, attacked from an unexpected side. There was no race to Baghdad: George H.W. Bush believed that Saddam Hussein would be removed from within, through a coup d'état or by popular uprising.
By contrast, George W. Bush has had little experience outside the United States, apart from Mexico. An increasingly influential group of advisers have long focused on the inherent evil of Saddam Hussein. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the President accept their reasoning. Rumsfeld, however, wants to "go it light," relative to what was enunciated in the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Several divisions, aircraft battle groups and the like, plus more accurate precision-guided weapons and British troops, don't make up for the absence of forces able to guard long supply lines from attack. Military success would require thousands—hundreds of thousands—of U.S. and British soldiers on the ground. The most important difference (and I'm writing on Wednesday afternoon and very early Thursday morning) is that the U.S. preemptive effort directed specifically at Saddam Hussein failed. Then the high-tech, made-for-TV, full-scale invasion and bombing started.
There are similarities, to be certain. The two started with long logistical build-ups, for conditions in the Persian Gulf are extremely difficult. The time necessary to transport troops and materiel involves months. The gap in modern, functional military equipment between American and Iraqi militaries is enormous, although sandstorms wreak havoc on U.S. electronic systems, helicopter and troop advances, and the like.
The "hundred hours war" bears scant resemblance to what I fervently hope will not be the start of a new hundred years war.
Given that world opinion has turned rather drastically against the U.S., can our reputation, such as it was, be restored? What would it take?
Any restoration of favorable public opinion towards the United States will take years in much of Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, and decades if not centuries through many parts of the Islamic world (despite the widespread distaste for Saddam Hussein). There is enough historical evidence to show that military victory almost never leads to democratization; post-World War II Germany and Japan were exceptions. Giving aid, professing commitment to democracy and the rule of law and the like all fly in the face of what is being presented and understood outside our borders as an act of unjustifiably strong American military attack.
Long term, we need to be patient; to recognize that "war is politics by other means" and hence, political steps are essential, and to give serious attention to the Israel-Palestine issue.
What will be the long-term effect of the war on the United Nations?
The United Nations is bruised, not broken. It will play a major role in relief, as funds flow and ports and roads are cleared of mines. In political terms, its role is more complex. The UN needs the U.S. and vice-versa. The United States used its veto power to prevent the re-election of the previous UN Secretary-General—and Kofi Annan has been staunch in his support of the historic, consultative role of the UN and the centrality of the Security Council. (So too have been France, China and Russia.) Historians will contrast Annan's and Bush's stands, and be better able to judge the long-term outcome.
The Iraqi-US war is being critiqued in real time by both sides, with military leaders, political leaders and fighters being interviewed even as the battle rages. Is this the first war in which battle has been waged on the ground, in the air and over telecommunication systems simultaneously?
Yes—it is unique, and fascinating.
What are the implications of this situation? In the end, is it the air and ground war that matters most, or the battle for "hearts and minds?"
The answers to these questions would have to be lengthy, but time is limited. As I suggested above, there are major implications for American relations with other countries, including a post-Saddam Iraq. A high-tech war, if victorious and brief, will be impressive and will spur other countries to try to develop similar systems. Terrorists will continue to use low-tech devices (box cutters, suicide bombers, etc.) to pursue their objectives. A protracted war would severely and negatively affect the U.S. military, the civilian populace of Iraq and public opinion in most of the world, to say the least. I go for "hearts and minds."
As of Reporter press time, there has been no use by Iraq of chemical or biological weapons, and advancing coalition forces have found no evidence of such weapons. Do you think this aspect has been overblown by the Bush administration, or is there a real danger of Iraq using such weapons?
What about the Atropine and gas masks found in the battle kits of Iraqi soldiers Tuesday? I think there is a real danger of chemical or biological weapons being used as American forces approach Baghdad. I cannot judge if the danger has been overblown. And let us not forget that should these weapons be used, unprepared civilians will suffer the most.
It's been mentioned in the press that displaying U.S. prisoners of war on Iraqi television violates the Geneva Conventions. What are the Geneva Conventions?
This is a definite violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which Iraq ratified in 1956): captured fighters are not to be displayed in a fashion that is publicly humiliating. To explain briefly, the four Geneva Conventions (and two subsequent Protocols) were drafted through the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. They set internationally recognized standards to provide for the safety of soldiers, sailors and aviators who are wounded, captured or otherwise taken out of combat; they also provide for protection of civilians during times of conflict.
Guerilla tactics like those being used by the Iraqis helped to defeat the U.S. in Vietnam. How is this situation different?
The situation in Iraq is still evolving. An obvious contrast deals with density of vegetation and population in Vietnam and the desert areas of Iraq (it's a different ballgame altogether in urban areas); there are clear similarities in the swampy section of southern Iraq and along the extended supply lines, where fedayeen troops are operating.
If the fighting does move to Baghdad and this becomes an urban war—which typically results in a high number of casualties—is it possible that Saddam Hussein could win by inflicting so many casualties that the U.S. public will demand that we get out?
Yes.
How do you think this war will effect the Bush presidency, his popularity and the 2004 presidential election?
It's too early to tell. There was the usual bounce in Presidential approval ratings immediately after the initial bombings, but doubts have already started to set in, as the media have reported. There's lots of time until the 2004 election, and one of my colleagues is a nationally respected specialist on Presidential campaigns—ask Professor James Campbell at the appropriate time.
What question do you wish I had asked, and how would you have answered it?
The Pope and many other religious leaders have spoken out directly against the war. As John Paul II stated Tuesday, "it should be clear" that, with the exception of self-defense against an aggressor, "a large part of humanity" has rejected war as an instrument of resolving conflict between nations. Why has there been such a seemingly deaf ear to his and others' appeals? Does national interest and presumed international interest always trump moral concerns?