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Franco Mattei is associate professor of political science and an expert in presidential and congressional elections, presidential nominating campaigns and voting behavior.
What used to be "Super Tuesday" is now "Super Duper Tuesday," with 22 states holding primaries on Feb. 5. Why are states choosing to hold their primaries earlier in the campaign season? Does this lessen the importance of the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary?
“Front-loading,” the scheduling of state primaries and caucuses as early as possible in the presidential election year, is one of the most debated—and deprecated—features of recent nominating campaigns. In particular this year, for the first time since 1928, a sitting president or vice president is not a declared candidate for the nomination of either major political party. The unusual openness and potential groundbreaking nature of the race for the White House (with several potential first-time winners—a woman, an African-American, a Mormon, an Italian-American or even an ultra-septuagenarian) has reinforced the desire of many states to be influential players in the selection of a presidential nominee, and thus their determination to schedule an early primary or caucus so as to draw the attention of the candidates and force them to address their voters’ concerns. As a consequence, the much-lamented “front-loading” of the presidential nominating process observed in recent elections underwent a very significant, albeit predictable, acceleration. Many state party leaders and elected officials have likened such an inexorable forward movement to an escape from political irrelevance, subordination and/or exploitation. A late date in the election sequence carries several handicaps: It dilutes the opportunity to participate in the winnowing of the field of candidates that takes place in the opening contests, traditionally the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary; it diminishes the range of available and viable options because of the attrition occurring at earlier stages of the campaign; and it may even deny any meaningful choice if the winning candidate already has been determined by the cumulative outcome of the previous delegate-selection events. Insult is added to injury when these “late” states are targeted by the candidates’ fund-raising efforts so that they end up subsidizing a nominating process in which their voters play a secondary, or even superfluous, role at the ballot box. This year, the Iowa caucuses (Jan. 3) and the New Hampshire primaries (Jan. 8) took place earlier than ever; the separation between the two contests (five days) is the shortest ever (back in 1976, it was five weeks and has been eight days since 1984). Finally, “Super Tuesday,” historically a March event with a southern flavor, is on Feb. 5 and is much more national in scope. One may call it a “Super Bowl” Tuesday, as it is scheduled right after the football game (but I don’t think any candidate is paying for a 30-second ad during the game). In any event, it is certainly a Fat (delegate-rich) Tuesday.
Some have argued that the influence of the few states at the top of the line would see their impact on the outcome of the nomination enhanced by the massive concentration of contests on Feb. 5. The winners of the earliest events are expected to greatly benefit from extensive free publicity and positive media coverage, and ride a powerful wave of momentum that could carry them to a sweeping, and perhaps decisive, victory on Feb. 5. Conversely, losers would be hard pressed to recover from a fall right out of the gate. As in past election cycles, some would drop out of the race (i.e., Biden, Dodd, Richardson), while others may stay in a bit longer hoping for a second chance (i.e., Edwards). Those with bigger war chests, national recognition and establishment support have the incentive and the means to soldier on; however, in a very compressed calendar and a vastly expanded playing field, their resources may soften, but not neutralize, the blow and the negative reports generated by defeats at the polls. These hypothesized dynamics, of course, offer ample justification for states such as Iowa and New Hampshire to adopt whatever date is necessary to preserve their place in presidential politics as “first” in the nation (mandated by their respective statutes) and protect their unique role in sizing up and sorting out the field of candidates for the rest of the country. In contested campaigns held after 1972, no party nominee has finished lower than third in Iowa (not counting preferences for “uncommitted,” which were higher than preferences for Clinton in 1992 and for Carter in 1976) or second in New Hampshire. Indeed, over the past eight cycles, with the sole exception of Bill Clinton in 1992, the two major parties have nominated candidates who won either Iowa or New Hampshire. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the two states continue to draw a disproportionate share of candidate time, media attention, polling data and campaign spending. Given the unprecedented figures on all these indicators in 2007-08, the perceived importance of the Iowa/New Hampshire pair was clearly more pronounced during this cycle. Voters also turned out at record levels in both states, especially on the Democratic side. On the other hand, the mixed election results did not provide any candidate with overpowering momentum.
The alternative scenario—most evidently reflected in Rudy Giuliani’s strategy to win the Republican nomination—is one in which the importance and impact of the very early (and small) states will be dwarfed or reduced by the de facto national primary of Feb. 5 and its prequel in Florida on Tuesday. The key point of both the scenario and the strategy, or calculated gamble, is the hard count of delegates needed to clinch the nomination rather than the momentum generated by the outcome in small states. In a crowded field, early results may not be decisive and thus fail to launch a clear and consistent winner endowed with the positive force of “big mo” (momentum). Hence, in the context of a muddled scoreboard and the absence of a consensus front-runner or a strong leader breaking out ahead of the pack, a candidate with broad name recognition, ample resources and extensive organization may afford to skip the early contests, banking on his/her ability to effectively compete and collect the chips that ultimately decide the game (delegates). On Feb. 5, the more than 20 states holding primaries or caucuses will send between 45 and 51 percent of the total number of delegates to the national conventions. Given the history of the past 30 years, this path to the nomination is an oddity; we have never seen a leading contender, much less a candidate on top of national polls (as Giuliani has been throughout 2007, albeit at a rather modest level, garnering the support of about one-third of Republican voters, at best), making a limited effort in the early states, “hanging around” for several weeks before trying to leave his footprint on the political turf of choice (Florida, in the case of Giuliani), actually win there and use this success as a springboard to victory in the ensuing contests. It may be a case of asking for too much, too late.
What impact will this front-loading of primaries have on the nomination process? Will voters benefit in the long run?
Most scholars have argued that front-loading does not serve the voters well. In particular, a highly compressed schedule is faulted for a rush to judgment that results in the early closure of the candidate-selection process and the exclusion of many voters—those residing in late states—from a full and meaningful participation in the choice of nominees.
Will the calendar change in 2012? As I mentioned earlier, “front-loading” has been roundly criticized before. This year, the chaotic scramble among the states to secure a leading spot in the order of presidential contests has provided fresh fodder for those who have advocated reforms that would, ideally, produce a fairer and more orderly process. Members of Congress have proposed several bills and political scientists have offered different plans. However, while there seems to be widespread agreement that the current process is broken or in need of major repair, there is no consensus as to what would be the best fix or how an alternative could or should be implemented.
All of the candidates now have Web sites, blogs and MySpace and Facebook profiles, and video from campaign stops routinely appears on YouTube. Can you talk about the impact of the Internet on this election?
Of course, the Internet has had a powerful influence on the way candidates campaign, advertise, reach and mobilize their supporters. Voters get their information and connect with like-minded citizens; money is raised; the news agenda is shaped (with the mainstream media often taking cues from the blogosphere). One could mention several instances of the political impact of the Internet. One may single out the “macaca” moment during the 2006 Senate election in Virginia. Incumbent Republican George Allen, considered a shoo-in for a second term and a likely presidential contender in 2008, made a disparaging comment about a supporter of Indian descent of his Democratic opponent, Jim Webb, that was caught and disseminated through YouTube. It marked the beginning of the end of Allen’s bid for both the Senate and the White House. It opened up a significant space in the quest for the Republican nomination that Mike Huckabee has been able to claim in Iowa and others will try to occupy—most notably Mitt Romney.
What’s your take on things so far? Will the nominations essentially be decided on Feb. 5?
In all likelihood, the nomination campaigns in both parties should yield a political winner or a clear-cut favorite by Feb. 5. In any event, it is very hard to see how campaigns may still be under way past March 4, when two more big states, Ohio and Texas, go to the polls. Even if we were to wait until then, it still would mark the earliest end to the intra-party competition and the beginning of the longest general election contest.
Everybody should be cautious in making predictions, especially this year; conventional wisdom and forecasts already have been upset by events. After his convincing success in Iowa, pollsters and pundits expected Obama to surf a tide of momentum into New Hampshire. Hillary Clinton was long considered “inevitable,” then politically moribund after Iowa, just before scoring a stunning, “Dewey Defeats Truman” comeback victory in New Hampshire that even surprised the candidate herself.
In the Republican field, McCain had seemingly lost his viability during the summer and fall, but did better than expected in Iowa—where Mike Huckabee capped a steady rise since his good show in the party’s straw poll—and won in New Hampshire. Thus, after the first two contests, the situation was quite fluid in both parties—against the expectations and perhaps the fears of many anticipating much greater clarity and separation among candidates.
On the Democratic side, the contest looks like a two-candidate race—it is difficult to see how Edwards might emerge as a winner. Hillary Clinton is the kind of “establishment” front-runner who, given the evidence from past election cycles, normally manages to win the nomination, even if humbled and hobbled by some setback. Obama is the “insurgent” candidate, but he looks more formidable than other contenders of this kind, such as Gary Hart in 1984. He has and will generate the resources needed to compete nationally; he is likely to energize African-American voters, a key party constituency, across the country and especially in the South, beginning with South Carolina on Saturday. Finally, he also has a message of inclusion, hope and change that resonates among the party rank-and-file and beyond.
On the Republican side, we have an unusually fragmented picture, with no clear front-runner. All the candidates display limitations and weaknesses in terms of their appeal to their party’s voters, each seeking and finding so far partial validation in some state so as to build strength and plausibly win by attrition and progressive elimination of opponents. Romney’s path to victory was premised on winning the earliest states and generating enough momentum to carry him forward. He only finished second in Iowa and New Hampshire; however, he was first on Michigan’s familiar ground and in little noticed Wyoming, and so he moves on. He may be helped the most by the increasing salience of economic concerns and can rely on personal wealth to sustain his bid. McCain failed to repeat his New Hampshire victory in Michigan, as he did in 2000 when he beat Bush. Yet, his success in the Granite State has turned him into the national front-runner. He still needs to overcome considerable reservations among conservative Republicans. Huckabee appears to enjoy the solid backing of white evangelical Christians, a strong constituency that gave him the support necessary to win Iowa. Finally, Giuliani has set his sights on Florida as a launch pad to Super Tuesday. The lack of a clear front-runner is precisely the kind of scenario that his “delegate” strategy required; now, however, the candidate needs to help himself and demonstrate that he can beat his challengers.